Security & trust

Security & trust model

Trust summary

Party Trusted for Not trusted for
Buyer Signing its own payments Anything about the seller
Seller Serving after the agreed event Handling buyer keys
x402interop facilitator Verifying, submitting the origin transfer, tracking, honest reporting Moving funds beyond what buyers signed
NEAR Intents Executing the swap and delivering or refunding Not trustless: funds are custodied by the settlement system during a swap
Chain facilitators (pass-through) Settling same-chain payments -

Design principle from x402: a facilitator or server must not be able to move funds other than as the client intended. Every buyer signature is bound to one quote, one deposit address, one nonce, and an expiry.

Threats and mitigations

Threat Mitigation
Deposit address reuse or substitution Single-use address per quote; verify address and amount exactly match the quote before settling
Replay of a signed payment Nonces, expiry, and rejection of replays after refund
Quote expiry race Enforce expiresAt; refuse to settle after expiry
Amount mismatch or short deposit Exact-match checks; automatic refund for short deposits
Refund to the wrong party Validate refundTo equals the buyer’s origin-chain address
Seller loses value in on_deposit mode Per-buyer and per-seller exposure caps; refund is automatic on failure
Facilitator compromise Minimal hot keys (gas relayer only); monitoring and key rotation
Leaking the 1Click API key Server-side only; never in 402 responses, payloads, logs, or client code
Malicious catalog entries Health probes, delisting, rate limits on registration, source labeling
Prompt injection via catalog text Treat discovery metadata as untrusted data (see MCP guide)
Webhook forgery Signed webhooks; sellers verify signatures
Denial of service on quote minting Rate limits, caching, per-key quotas
Double payment from retries Idempotency keys; payment_status before retry

Custody disclosure

Users and sellers must be told, in plain language, that while a swap is in progress their funds are held by the NEAR Intents settlement system, which either delivers the destination asset or refunds the deposit. This is not a trustless path. Credit accounts (Intents balance, Lightning top-up) add exposure to the facilitator’s operations and must be disclosed and capped.

Operational controls

  • Separate keys per function; hardware-backed storage for any key that can move funds.
  • Alerting on stuck swaps, refund spikes, and balance anomalies.
  • Reconciliation job comparing facilitator records with 1Click statuses.
  • Audit log for quotes, verifications, settlements, and refunds.
  • Dependency pinning and review (supply-chain risk).

Regulatory note

Operating payment infrastructure, holding user credit, or running a Lightning node may carry licensing and compliance obligations depending on jurisdiction. This document is not legal advice; obtain qualified advice before launching to real users.

Reporting vulnerabilities